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Crime, Italian Style

ILLEGALITY AND CRIME ARE FREQUENTLY ASSUMED to be intertwined with the history of Italy to a greater extent than in any other Western country. They are often presented as key variables in understanding Italy's past and present. Are these assumptions correct? If so, why? How do crime and illegality manifest themselves in Italy? What are the historical roots of these phenomena? What is their impact on the economic, political, and social life of the country? What has been done to control *contra legem* activities in Italy? This essay will give an answer to these questions.

SURPRISING STATISTICAL COMPARISONS AND ITALIAN PECULIARITIES

Statistical yearbooks do not suggest that Italy's rates of crime and illegality are especially unusual. A comparison of major Western countries reveals that Italy's rates are within the Western European average and far below the crime rates registered in the United States. According to international comparisons carried out by the British Home Office, for instance, in 1997 the murder rate in Italy (1.61 per 100,000 population) was slightly higher than that in France (1.60), Germany (1.44), and the United Kingdom (1.49) but considerably lower than the rate in countries usually considered nonviolent, such as Finland (2.76) and Spain (2.60).[1] Further, Italy's murder rate was more than

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four times lower than the U.S. rate (7.34). In 1997, the rate in Italy for motor-vehicle thefts (538.2 per 100,000 population) was also below those registered in France (693.4) and the United Kingdom (755.3). As far as drug trafficking was concerned, Italy fared even better. In 1997, the rate of drug-trafficking cases recorded by the police in Italy (71.9) was, in fact, dramatically lower than that in Germany (84.5) and in France (144.5)—and almost eight times lower than the rate in the United States (562.8).

A frightening picture does not emerge even from the statistics concerning prison populations. As of September 1, 1997, according to a survey conducted by the Council of Europe, 50,197 people were detained in Italian prisons. In France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States on the same date, the prison population was respectively 54,442, 71,047, 69,603, and 1,725,842.[2]

International crime comparisons are always risky. In each country, rates of crime depend on incongruent definitions of crime, different ways of reporting crimes, and varying methods of collecting data on crime. The former two variables also influence the dimensions of each country's prison population. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the above data seem to leave no doubt: Italy does not have an extraordinary crime problem. No more murders, thefts, and drug-trafficking cases proportionally take place in Italy than in the other major Western industrialized countries.

Is there really anything unusual, then, about crime and illegality in Italy? Although the statistics suggest not, there are grounds to think so. There are, after all, *contra legem* phenomena that 1) are specifically Italian or 2) manifest themselves with a particular intensity and frequency in the country. The best example of a specifically Italian form of illegality is the mafia in Southern Italy. Good examples of illegal activities that are especially salient in Italy include corruption and the black market. Although corrupt practices and the distribution of goods through an underground economy are by no means exclusively Italian phenomena, both are more widespread in Italy than in any other Western country.[3]

MAFIA

Contrary to what most scholars maintained up to the early 1980s,[4] judicial inquiries carried out since then have proved that formalized mafia groups do exist. Cosa Nostra in Sicily and the 'Ndrangheta in Calabria are the largest and most stable coalitions and are each composed of about a hundred mafia groups. Their members are estimated at about three thousand and five thousand males respectively.

Though it is not possible to establish clear lines of continuity, antecedents of the contemporary mafia associations existed in the 1880s, if not before. The discovery of new documents in archives and a more objective analysis of the already known papers has demonstrated the presence of mafia groups in Sicily and Calabria since the mid-nineteenth century.[5]

Cosa Nostra and the 'Ndrangheta possess the distinguishing trait of organizations: they have independent ruling bodies that regulate the internal life of each associated family and are clearly different from the authority structure of their members' biological families. Moreover, during the last four decades of the twentieth century superordinate bodies of coordination were set up—first in Cosa Nostra, then in the 'Ndrangheta as well. Composed of the most important family chiefs, they are known as "commissions." Although the powers of these collegial bodies are rather limited, the unity of the two confederations cannot be doubted. In fact, their cohesion is guaranteed by the sharing of common cultural codes and a single organizational formula.[6] According to a model prevalent in premodern societies, Cosa Nostra and the 'Ndrangheta are "segmentary societies":[7] that is, they depend on what Emile Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity,"[8] which derives from the replication of corporate and cultural forms.

Neither Cosa Nostra nor the 'Ndrangheta can be assimilated to the ideal type of legal-rational bureaucracy defined by Max Weber, as was pointed out by Donald Cressey in the late 1960s in a study of the American Cosa Nostra.[9] Far from recruiting their staff and organizing their work according to the criteria and procedures of modern bureaucracies, mafia groups impose what Weber called a "status contract" upon their members.[10] With the ritual initiation into a mafia *cosca*, the novice is required to assume a permanent, new identity—to become a "man of honor"—and to subordinate all his previous allegiances to mafia membership. If necessary, he must be ready to sacrifice even his life for the mafia family.

The "men of honor" in Sicily and Calabria are obliged to keep secret the composition, the action, and the strategies of their mafia group. In Cosa Nostra, in particular, the duty of silence is absolute. Secrecy constitutes, above all, a defense strategy. Since the unification of Italy in 1861 mafia groups have been at least formally criminalized by the state. In order to protect themselves from arrest and criminal prosecution for their continuing recourse to violence, they have needed to resort to various degrees of secrecy.

The ceremony of affiliation creates ritual ties of brotherhood among the members of a mafia family: the "status contract" is simultaneously an act of fraternization.[11] The new recruits become "brothers" to all members and share what anthropologists call a regime of generalized reciprocity:[12] this presupposes altruistic behavior without expecting any short-term reward. As F. Lestingi, chief prosecutor for the king, pointed out in 1884, mafia groups constitute brotherhoods whose "essential character" lies in "mutual aid without limits and without measure, and even in crimes."[13] Only thanks to the trust and solidarity created by fraternization does it become possible to pursue "purposive contracts,"[14] i.e., to promote the personal interests of the affiliates through collective action.

As secret brotherhoods using violence, Southern Italian mafia associations have remarkable similarities to associations such as the Chinese Triads and the Japanese Yakuza. With their centuries-old histories, articulated structures, and sophisticated ritual and symbolic apparatuses, all these associations—and the American descendant of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra—have few parallels in the world of organized crime. None of the other groups that systematically traffic in illegal commodities have the same degree of complexity and longevity.[15]

Cosa Nostra and the 'Ndrangheta share another important peculiarity with the Chinese Triads and the Japanese Yakuza.

Unlike other contemporary organized crime groups, they do not content themselves with producing and selling illegal goods and services. Though these activities have acquired an increasing relevance over the past thirty years, neither the trade in illegal commodities nor the maximization of profits has ever been the primary goal of these associations. As a matter of fact, it is hardly possible to identify a single goal. Southern Italian mafia coalitions are multifunctional organizations. In the past hundred years, their members have exploited the strength of mafia bonds to pursue various endeavors and to accomplish the most disparate tasks. Already in 1876 the Tuscan aristocrat Leopoldo Franchetti pointed out the "extraordinary elasticity" of the associations of *malfattori* (evildoers): "the goals multiply, the field of action widens, without the need to multiply the statutes; the association divides for certain goals, remains united for others."[16]

Among these tasks the exercise of political domination has always been preeminent. The ruling bodies of Cosa Nostra and the 'Ndrangheta claim, above all, an absolute power over their members. They control every aspect of their members' lives, and they aim to exercise a similar power over the communities where their members reside. For a long time, their power had a higher degree of effectiveness and legitimacy than that exercised by the state. In Western Sicily and in Southern Calabria mafia associations successfully policed the general population, settling conflicts, recovering stolen goods, and enforcing property rights. Even today, although most of these rules are no longer systematically enforced, mafia families exercise a certain "sovereignty" through a generalized system of extortion. As a state would do, they tax the main productive activities carried out within their territory.

In the second half of the twentieth century, Southern Italy's mafia associations have participated in at least three plots organized by right-wing terrorist groups; since the late 1970s Cosa Nostra has assassinated dozens of policemen, magistrates, and politicians. The mafia challenge to state power reached a climax in the early 1990s. In 1992, Cosa Nostra murdered the Palermitan Judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in two spectacular bomb explosions. In 1993, in an effort to demonstrate the national power of the mafia, a series of bombings occurred—for the first time out of traditional mafia strongholds—in Rome, Florence, and Milan.[17]

Despite their power, mafia fraternities have not been able to guarantee themselves a monopoly in any sector of the illegal economy outside of Southern Italy. In the early 1980s, Cosa Nostra families played a pivotal role in the transcontinental heroin trade from Asia to the United States via Sicily. But in the second half of that decade, the Cosa Nostra lost this position after being targeted by law-enforcement investigations and replaced in the U.S. market by a plethora of Mexican, Chinese, and, more recently, Colombian heroin suppliers.[18]

Despite the growing relevance of economic activities, according to Ada Becchi and Margherita Turvani, "the mafia has not become a set of criminal *enterprises*."[19] Its history as well as its cultural and normative apparatus prevent this transformation and today constitute a constraint as much as a resource. By building a strong collective identity, shared cultural codes and norms enhance group cohesion and create trustful relationships among mafia members. The reliance on status and fraternization contracts, which are nonspecific and long-term, produces a high degree of flexibility and makes the multifunctionality of mafia groups possible. The same shared cultural codes and norms also represent, however, a powerful brake on entrepreneurial initiative.

Especially constraining is one of the preconditions for recruitment: only men born either in Sicily or in Calabria or descending from mafia families can be admitted as members. This rule has long prevented Cosa Nostra and 'Ndrangheta families from adding new members with the experience necessary to compete in the black markets for arms, money, and gold. Rigid recruitment criteria have also hampered the geographical expansion of mafia power. Cosa Nostra, for example, prohibits settling families outside of Sicily. This self-imposed rule has limited its involvement in the international narcotics trade—currently the largest of the illegal markets. 'Ndrangheta families, thanks to their extensive branches in Northern Italy and abroad, played a larger role in narcotics trafficking in the 1990s, importing large quantities of cocaine and hashish from Latin America and

North Africa; today, however, the 'Ndrangheta faces new competition from foreign and Italian traffickers with more direct connections to drug-producing and transit countries.[20]

The "will to power" of the mafia associations also negatively affects security and business decisions, as a Palermitan prosecutor pointed out in 1992:

> The true goal is power. The obscure evil of organization chiefs is not the thirst for money, but the thirst for power. The most important fugitives could enjoy a luxurious life abroad until the end of their days. Instead they remain in Palermo, hunted, in danger of being caught or being killed by internal dissidents, in order to prevent the loss of their territorial control and not run the risk of being deposed. Marino Mannoia [a former mafia member now cooperating with law enforcement authorities] once told me: "Many believe that you enter into Cosa Nostra for money. This is only part of the truth. Do you know why I entered Cosa Nostra? Because before in Palermo I was Mr. Nobody. Afterwards, wherever I went, heads lowered. And to me this is priceless."[21]

As a result, ever since the early 1990s Cosa Nostra and 'Ndrangheta families have extracted a growing percentage of their income from entrepreneurial activities that depend on the exercise of regional political domination. They practice systematic extortion in their communities and, thanks to intimidation and collusion with corrupt politicians, they have struggled to control the market for public works.[22]

Unlike other Western forms of organized crime, the meaning (and danger) of Sicilian and Calabrian mafia associations cannot be limited to their involvement in illegal markets. Their peculiarity lies in their will to exercise political power and their interest in exercising sovereign control over the people in their communities.

CORRUPTION

Corruption is a ubiquitous phenomenon worldwide, one that occurs at the intersection of the public and private spheres. No country can claim to be free of it. Italy, however, seems to be affected by corruption to a special degree. On the 1999 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, for example, Italy occupies the thirty-eighth place with a score of 4.7 (10: highly clean; 0: highly corrupt). It is considered more corrupt than all Western countries, and also more corrupt than Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Namibia, Tunisia, and Malaysia.[23]

Unlike the mafia, which has its roots in Southern Italy, corruption is a nationwide phenomenon. The so-called Clean Hands investigations revealed for the first time the full extent of corrupt exchanges in Italy. The investigations were initiated in Milan, by the prosecutor's office there. Starting in February of 1992 with the arrest of the obscure manager of a Milan public institution, the inquiries of the local prosecutors quickly expanded, bringing to light a wide network of illegality and corruption: the so-called *Tangentopoli* ("Bribesville," initially an allusion to Milan). The spectacular success of the Milan team spurred judges elsewhere. One after another, politicians who had dominated national politics during the previous decade came under investigation. In November of 1993, parliamentary immunity was temporarily abolished. By then, prosecutors in numerous Italian cities had filed 851 requests for authorization to investigate 447 deputies—more than half of the members of the Italian Parliament.[24]

Corruption scandals have emerged throughout the history of the Italian state.[25] Italian capitalism has been characterized since its inception by a close and suspiciously cozy connection between large corporations and the state, as pointed out by Vilfredo Pareto at the beginning of the twentieth century. "In Italy we can note that all the newly acquired wealth has its roots in public bids, railway constructions, state-funded companies and custom protection. . . . As a result, this order appears to experienced politicians as a lottery, which grants prizes, some large and some smaller ones."[26]

At the same time, Southern elites and the rural masses were largely integrated into the national political system through a web of cliental relationships, which hopelessly compromised bureaucracies formally committed to impersonal and universalistic principles.[27] Not even the collapse of fascism and the rise of mass parties after World War II could destroy the patronage systems used to secure political power in the South. There was merely a transformation from the traditional organization of clientalism, based around local notables, to a bureaucratic system that recruited interest groups and organized patronage through party officials.[28]

Up until the late 1960s, corruption—meant as an exchange of money for political favors—was by and large confined to the country's ruling elite. Only large corporations and leading politicians took part in these exchanges, which rarely involved the civil service or local government. Corruption was not yet a regular and accepted practice, and there was not a widespread network of people accustomed to paying and receiving bribes.

Starting in the late 1960s, however, a progressive change took place. Corruption lost its elite character. It became a common and socially accepted behavior, spread across all social strata and involving an even larger number of low- and middle-level politicians and bureaucrats.[29] First, kickbacks were paid by the *suppliers* of goods and services to the government.[30] The "Clean Hands" investigations revealed that companies paid off officials at different stages of the bidding process in order to be included in the list of qualified bidders, to be selected as the winning contractor, to get an inflated price for the job, or to be able to cut corners on quality. In some cases, long-term agreements were reached between companies and the representatives of political parties to manipulate bids and keep potential competitors from winning access to the market.

At the same time, kickbacks were also paid by the *demanders* of political favors or subsidies. Licenses, authorizations, credits, tax reductions, and state enterprises about to be sold became the object of bribery. Third, kickbacks were routinely paid by those who could be called *avoiders*, i.e., individuals and firms seeking to escape taxes or to get a favorable interpretation of the law. Many examples could be quoted to illustrate these two types of corruption, ranging from petty bribes to obtain a passport, a driver's license, or a cemetery plot to billion-lira kickbacks to avoid taxes or sanctions.[31] In particular, illegal payments to *Guardia di Finanza* officials in charge of revising companies' tax declarations became very frequent and systematic in the 1980s. More than seventy officials of the

Italian tax police (including a general) were indicted for criminal association and corruption; one of the prosecutors coordinating the investigations called them a "gang in uniform."[32]

Judicial decisions were also corrupted in this climate. Not only did mafia associations frequently try to manipulate court decisions by bribing, threatening, and, occasionally, even murdering judges and prosecutors, but legitimate companies and politicians routinely resorted to threats and bribes. In most cases the politicians did not even have to pay a bribe. Up until the 1980s, leaders in the government parties by and large had no problems finding judges who were ready to cover up their misdeeds. Some of the magistrates felt obliged to "save" the members of the political elite because they considered it their duty to defend the establishment that they too belonged to. Others gave in to political pressure because they were promised promotion in their judicial careers. Only from the early 1980s onwards were magistrates more and more frequently bought with bribes.[33] All the major investigations on corrupt exchanges that were initiated before the outburst of "Clean Hands" were successfully blocked by the dominant political parties.[34] The Rome Court was long known as the "foggy port," because many "hot" penal proceedings involving politicians and large companies were spuriously transferred there and then promptly dismissed by solicitous judges.[35]

During the 1980s, corruption flourished as perhaps never before. The heads of the largest private and public companies illegally transferred billions of Italian lire to the main political parties and to single politicians in order to influence government and parliamentary decisions on tax and industrial policy.[36] In the case of Enimont, a public-private energy joint venture, Raul Gardini paid a hundred-billion-lira kickback to sell his half of the company to his state counterpart at an inflated price.[37]

With time, corruption became a socially accepted, commonplace practice within wide sectors of Italian society. Paying and receiving bribes no longer provoked moral disgust or fear of punishment. The point was made by Bettino Craxi, a former prime minister and leader of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI)—

one of the parties most deeply involved in corruption scandals—in a speech in Parliament in July of 1993:

> what needs to be said and what everybody knows very well is that a large part of the political financing is irregular or illegal. Parties—especially those having small or large apparatuses, newspapers, propaganda, promotion or association activities—as well as many and various operational political structures have resorted and resort to additional resources obtained in an irregular or illegal way. . . . If this matter must be considered primarily as a purely criminal matter, then a large part of the system would be a criminal system.[38]

What Craxi did not say was that kickbacks were accepted by politicians not only to supplement party funds, but also to accumulate personal wealth. For example, Craxi's hidden "savings" in tax havens around the world were variously estimated at between 200 and 750 billion lire.[39]

UNDERGROUND ECONOMY

The underground economy is a by-product of the state's efforts to regulate, tax, and supervise the economic activity carried out within its territory. As Portes, Castells, and Benton maintain, "it is but a slight exaggeration to assert that formality begets informality, insofar as one is meaningless without the other."[40] As such, though in differing degrees and forms, the underground economy is a "normal," unavoidable component of all modern societies.

In Italy, however, the underground economy seems to be more widespread than in any other Western nation. In the 1980s, the Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT), in an unprecedented step, revised the official estimate of Italy's gross domestic product by increasing it 8 percent in order to account for underground activities. The value of the Italian underground economy is, in fact, probably greater still. Using different methods, three studies carried out on behalf of the European Union estimated that Italy's underground economy accounted for between 20 and 36 percent of the nation's GDP in the 1990s.[41] The corresponding values for the other main EU countries were significantly lower. In the ORSEU's study, for example, the underground economy was estimated to contribute 4 to 6 percent of the GDP in Germany, 6 to 10 percent in France, and between 8 and 12 percent in the United Kingdom.

The activities belonging to the sphere of the underground economy do not share any common trait other than the fact that they are unsupervised by state bodies and/or prohibited by state laws. The underground economy is not a coherent system. It covers a group of heterogeneous activities and practices that are not amenable to any simple classification. Still, it is useful to distinguish between two main sectors of the underground economy. The informal sector consists of the production and sale of goods and services that are legal but that are produced and sold under unsupervised or irregular conditions. The criminal sector, by contrast, involves the production and circulation of illegal goods and services as well as the illegal production and distribution of legal commodities that are heavily regulated by the state.

The informal sector as a whole includes all those economic activities that are unrecorded in national statistical accounts and/or fail to meet such government requirements as registration, payment of taxes, payment of social security for employees, enforcement of health and safety rules, etc. Examples range from undeclared second jobs done during off-duty time to completely "off the book" employment in small businesses and households. Self-employed individuals, whether working full- or part-time, also produce much that is not properly recorded in national economic statistics. Occasionally there are also entire "ghost firms" or even industries that are completely unknown to tax and labor officers, such as the glove industry in Naples, a "ghost" industrial system that in the late 1980s produced two to three million pairs of gloves a year.

According to the estimates of the Italian Statistical Office, in 1997 there were 3,530,000 irregular labor units.[42] Undeclared employment thus represented 15.2 percent of the overall number of workers employed in the production of goods and services. The number of people involved in the informal economy, however, is even larger. According to Luca Meldolesi, an economist who recently carried out and coordinated several studies on the topic, undeclared employment represents about one-third of Italy's total employment: there are between three and four million full-time irregular workers, and one out of two workers obtains at least a portion of his or her income from undeclared employment.[43]

In Italy, as well as in most EU countries, traditional forms of irregular employment coexist with brand new ones. Whereas the latter are usually found in the service sector, the former are concentrated in agriculture, the building sector, and other traditional sectors, ranging from petty trade to tourism and the textile industry.[44] The consequences of irregular employment are most dire in the building sector. In fact, so-called *lavoro nero* is frequently employed to build whole buildings without the necessary authorizations, in protected areas, or without respecting security standards. Between 1994 and 1998 alone, 232,000 unauthorized houses were built, with a surface area of over 32.5 million square meters and a real estate value of 29 billion lire. The related tax evasion was estimated to be 6,700 billion lire by the Cresme, a research institute that specializes in the construction sector.[45] Especially in the South, some of the most beautiful country and seaside areas of the whole of Italy have been disfigured by rampant unauthorized house-building (*abusivismo edilizio*).[46]

Informal and unrecorded economic activities are particularly widespread in Southern Italy. In some crucial sectors of the Mezzogiorno economy, irregularities in production, employment, and exchange seem to be the rule rather than the exception. In the four key sectors of agriculture, construction, trade, and clothing and shoe manufacturing, irregular activities employ between 60 and 80 percent of the workforce. In some areas, such as Sicily and Calabria, the rate of irregular activity is estimated to be over 90 percent.[47] What is worse, enterprises resorting to irregular and unrecorded arrangements are often exploited by Southern Italian mafia groups as a "Trojan horse" to penetrate the legal economy and to launder the proceeds gained in the criminal sector of the underground economy.

More generally, in Northern as in Southern Italy, unreported economic activities and proceeds often constitute a precondition for the development of corrupt exchanges. "Clean Hands" investigations proved that several large Italian companies manipulated their budgets to build up unreported financial reserves in secret bank accounts abroad, out of which bribes were then paid to politicians, judges, and bureaucrats. Even Cesare Romiti, who was at that time chairman of Fiat, was sentenced on false accounting charges in 1997, and the conviction was confirmed by the court of appeals in 1999.[48]

Apart from the informal sector of the underground economy, there is a criminal sector. The latter includes the production and sale of commodities that are outlawed by most states and international bodies. Only two goods fully fit this criterion: some drugs, and all human beings. As a consequence of state and international bans, all exchanges of these "commodities" are bound to take place on the "wrong side of the law," and illegal markets have therefore developed.

Following international trends, a national illegal market in cannabis developed in Italy in the late 1960s. In the following decades heroin, cocaine, and, more recently, ecstasy have also been consumed and traded on a large scale. The traffic in human beings became a flourishing business in the early 1990s. Italy's closeness to the former Yugoslavia and other impoverished East European nations has made it a convenient landing place for thousands of migrants smuggled into the EU from the former Second and Third World. Some of these migrants are then forced into prostitution or otherwise exploited in both the criminal and informal sectors of the economy.[49]

Additionally, many other goods and services—ranging from arms and nuclear weapons to toxic waste, jewels, and counterfeited merchandise, from prostitution to gambling to money laundering—are marketed daily in violation of specific trade regulations and restrictions. Still others are exchanged without paying excise taxes: for example, tobacco has been smuggled on a large scale into Italy ever since the 1960s.

As already mentioned, Southern mafia associations are far from being the only actors in the criminal sector of the underground economy. Even though they tightly control most *contra legem* activities in the regions they dominate, they do not have monopolistic control over the national illegal market. Apart from Cosa Nostra and 'Ndrangheta members, a variety of different groups participate in the illegal economy.

There are groups and small bands of people engaged full-time in criminal activities, some of which—especially in Southern Italy—imitate the cultural apparatus and organization of Cosa Nostra and the 'Ndrangheta to gain cohesion and legitimacy. The criminal groups located around Naples refer to the *camorra* tradition, which goes back to the early nineteenth century.[50] As much as in most other Western countries, Italy's illegal markets are increasingly populated by foreign migrants, to whom crime represents "a queer ladder of social mobility."[51] Some of these are loose gangs, founded on ties of friendship and locality; others are family businesses or organizations cemented by profit-making or by shared revolutionary or ideological goals. White-collar criminals are also active, especially in the illegal markets that constitute a small section of their legal counterparts (such as illegal arms, gold, and money markets), but increasingly also in others. Thanks to their professional know-how and their low visibility, they enjoy considerable advantages vis-à-vis their underworld competitors.[52]

Given the variety of commodities and actors involved, it is difficult to estimate the overall revenue of the criminal sector. Though exorbitant estimates can often be read in the press, the revenue from the criminal sector in Italy represents only a small fraction of the total revenue of the underground economy. Italy's criminal economy is not significantly larger than that of other Western countries.

Some criminal activities—such as the smuggling of tobacco and human beings—do seem to be particularly prevalent in Italy, above all due to its extensive coastline and geographical position at the crossroads between North Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe. In 1992 and then again in 1994 the *Guardia di Finanza* (customs police) estimated that the yearly revenue from smuggling tobacco was more than 1,100 billion lire with a loss of about 1,100–1,200 billion lire in taxes (VAT and excise taxes).[53] No reliable estimates exist on the revenue from the traffic in human beings. Southern mafia associations and other organized crime groups also engage in illegal transfers of money—through extortion, embezzlement, fraud, or robbery, for example—that are not usually included in the definition of the underground economy because they do not create value but merely transfer it from one person to another. Extortion practices, in particular, constitute one of the most important sources of revenue for Southern Italian mafia and pseudo-mafia groups. According to estimates made by the *Direzione Centrale della Polizia Criminale,* extortion produces an annual revenue of at least 1,400 billion lire.[54]

On the whole, however, crime in Italy does not pay much, according to the most comprehensive and reliable estimates of the criminal economy. Working in cooperation with police forces and several other state agencies, in 1992 Guido Rey, then president of ISTAT, concluded that the total revenue from criminal enterprises was about 30,000 billion lire in 1990, with roughly 150,000 persons variously involved in these activities.[55]

The anomaly of Italy's underground economy thus lies not so much in the profits of the criminal sector as in the truly staggering size of the informal sector. The abnormal extension of the latter blurs the boundaries between the legal and the illegal, fosters corruption, and facilitates mafia penetration of the legal economy.

IN SEARCH OF EXPLICATIVE FACTORS

Complex social phenomena such as those described in the previous sections cannot be explained with reference to a single factor. No monocausal interpretation of events is possible. Contemporary mafia associations as well as the penchant shown by present-day Italians for corruption and underground economic activities can be traced back at least to the nineteenth century and have been influenced throughout their long history by a variety of social, cultural, economic, and political factors.

That said, some key agents can be pointed out. In particular, there is one factor that, more than any other single catalyst, seems to have favored the rise and consolidation of mafia associations, corruption, and the underground economy: the relative weakness and unpopularity of the Italian state ever since the country's unification in 1861. Even today, Italy is the only EU country where less than half of the population approves of its own state institutions. According to the Eurobarometer data released in April of 2000, only 27 percent of Italians are satisfied with the way democracy works in their country, whereas the EU average is 56 percent.[56]

Above all, the rise and consolidation of mafia associations must be related to the inability of the Bourbon government and then, for a long time, the Italian state to exert a legitimate monopoly on the use of physical force in the Mezzogiorno. The mafia is not the residue of a lawless past; "it is an outgrowth of the particular form that the process of state formation took in Italy."[57] The mafia developed because national systems of power expanded without fully subordinating local systems of power. Indeed, the central state had to rely on local landlords and mafia coalitions if it wanted to govern some areas at all. A vicious circle was consequently set in motion. As Henner Hess reminds us,

> we are never dealing with simple causal relationships but invariably with inter-dependencies. Thus the chronic weakness of the State resulted in the emergence of self-help institutions, and the exclusive power positions of informal groups subsequently made it impossible for the State to win the loyalty of the public, while its resultant weakness again strengthened the family, the clientele and *mafioso* positions.[58]

Within their local communities, mafia associations long enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy, because they filled the power vacuum left by a weak nation-state. The mafia fulfilled important functions of social integration and regulation. Even state institutions, though formally condemning mafia violence and occasionally repressing it, usually came to terms with the representatives of mafia power; in the territories under their control, the maintenance of public order fell, *de facto*, to the mafia leaders. As the Parliamentary Antimafia Commission finally acknowledged in 1993,

> In practice, the relationships between institutions and mafia took place for many years in the form of relationships between two distinct sovereignties: neither would attack the other as long as

> each remained within its own boundaries . . . an attack (by State forces) would be made only in response to an attack by Cosa Nostra, after which they would go back to being good neighbors again.[59]

Although mafia associations arose only in some parts of Southern Italy, pre-state community relationships, substantiated by kinship, friendship, and patronage ties, have remained strong throughout the country. By building networks of personal trust, this "social capital" has been a fundamental resource in the development of the so-called Third Italy (basically the Northeastern and Central regions).[60] But it has also created a favorable environment within which unrecorded economic transactions and shady deals between *mafiosi*, entrepreneurs, and politicians have been carried out with impunity. Relying on natural family loyalties, even mafia associations could maintain a veneer of legitimacy, by conforming to wider social patterns. Indeed, whenever the central government could not keep under control the particularistic potential of local social networks, the latter have tended to degenerate into clientelism, corruption, and underground economic activity.[61]

Faced with the continuing strength of kinship, friendship, and patronage ties at all levels of society, the Italian state has tried to enforce very cumbersome legal and bureaucratic rules. In almost all fields, Italian law strictly limits the discretion of public officials in order to guarantee the equal treatment of all subjects. Public contracts are very tightly regulated. Elaborate measures prevent one firm from gaining an unfair advantage over another in the bidding process. Unfortunately, the very stringency of the state's laws has encouraged ordinary citizens and legal businesses to try to evade them, generating new opportunities for corruption and informal agreements.[62]

An even more direct consequence of Italy's exceptionally detailed laws is the inefficiency and slowness of its bureaucracy. In the early 1990s Sabino Cassese, a longtime scholar of Italian public administration, calculated that each Italian citizen loses between 15 and 20 working days each year trying to cope with the country's stifling bureaucracy.[63] The situation may have slightly improved since then, but much still needs to be done. Since the mid-1990s, under the impulse of the cabinet minister for public administration, Franco Bassanini, the Italian government has launched an ambitious reform plan to modernize and speed up the Italian bureaucracy. This constitutes the first government-wide reform since 1865. In the second half of the 1990s important laws were enacted, but, as Bassanini himself realizes, laws alone are not enough to change the attitudes and behavior of both public employees and citizens.[64]

The rigidity and inefficiency of Italian public administration has historically been a powerful incentive for corruption and, more generally, for relying on informal chains of "friends of friends."[65] Especially in the last three decades of the twentieth century, the discretion of public officials, which was sharply constrained by law, has been illegitimately expanded through corruption. As Alessandro Pizzorno explains, "*Due* provisions are sold, because time and the relevant procedures have become a scarce resource that the public official uses as if it were his private property."[66] The final effect has long been the reintroduction of privilege and inequality in front of the law, which were to be eradicated with the introduction of rigid norms. Italians have come to avoid public bureaucracies whenever possible; they flout state regulations, resort to informal agreements, and, in some areas of the country, turn to mafia power in order to settle conflicts and regulate economic deals.

Corruption feeds on itself. When bribery becomes an institutionalized practice, honest politicians are penalized. For those directly involved in corrupt exchanges, moreover, it was a positive-sum game: both the briber and the bribee made money; the cost of the bribes was absorbed without their knowledge by the taxpayers.[67]

THE SOCIAL REVOLT AND THE JUDICIAL FIGHT AGAINST THE MAFIA AND CORRUPTION IN THE 1990s

It is true, then, that some forms of illegality are more prevalent in Italy than in other European countries. But it is also true that Italy has shown a remarkable commitment to fighting crime and corruption. In the last two decades of the twentieth century, Italy stood out because of its judicial campaigns against the mafia and corruption and the support these campaigns received from large sections of the civil society.

In recent years, a new generation of judges and prosecutors in Southern as well as in Northern Italy has tried to reassert the independence of the judiciary, which is formally guaranteed by the 1948 Italian Constitution. Starting in 1992, a group of Italian magistrates attacked corruption in Italy as never before. Their initiative received broad popular support, and this support prevented ruling politicians from stopping judicial investigations as they had routinely done in the past. In the course of one year, 1993, the five ruling parties of the postwar period—including the Christian Democrats—were wiped off the political map. At the same time, an unprecedented judicial campaign against the mafia also received broad popular support, even in Sicily.

Whereas people's anticorruption stance was new in the early 1990s, the antimafia movement has a longer history, with roots in the rural protest movements of the 1890s and the late 1940s. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, furthermore, there were enlightened minorities who denounced the mafia's power and its shadowy influence on Sicilian politics and the Sicilian economy.[68] But a truly mass, interclass social movement against the mafia emerged only in 1982. In September of that year, General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, who had been sent to Palermo in June as a high commissioner to combat the mafia, was killed, together with his wife and driver. The public reacted with outrage. Two weeks after the Dalla Chiesa murder, which followed the assassination of fifteen other state officials and politicians over the previous three years, the La Torre Act was passed. The new bill, named after the Sicilian Communist leader who had been killed by the mafia in April of 1982, introduced the crime of delinquent association of the mafia type (art. 416*bis* Penal Code) and authorized the seizure and forfeiture of illegally acquired property of those indicted under this article. Between 1982 and 1986 nearly 15,000 men were arrested throughout Italy for criminal association of the mafia type; 706 were brought to trial by investigating magistrates in Palermo; more than half of those accused, including several mafia chiefs, received long-term or lifelong convictions (the so-called *maxi-processo*).

The state's renewed antimafia campaign won widespread public support. Shocked by the murder of Dalla Chiesa and his young wife, citizens of Palermo participated in unprecedented public demonstrations, including a spontaneous candlelight procession in honor of his memory. Since then a "protean and multifaceted" antimafia movement has taken root in Italy.[69] In 1985 Leoluca Orlando, a member of a reformist, left-wing current of the Christian Democratic party who had taken a clear stance against the mafia, began to serve as mayor of Palermo. During his administration, which lasted until 1990, city hall became a focal point for attacks on the mafia. For the multiplicity of activities that accompanied Palermo's *maxi-processo*, the mid-1980s were labeled as "Palermo's spring."

After a period of retreat and disillusionment in the late 1980s, antimafia movements recovered energy and vitality in the early 1990s. The next antimafia initiative that attracted popular support involved an assault on extortion rackets. Following the model of the *Associazione commercianti di Capo d'Orlando* in the province of Messina, antiracketeering associations were created in Sicily and elsewhere to report collectively threats of extortion and to help bring racketeers to trial.[70] As a result, in 1992, the peak year of activism, arrests for extortion rose by 17.6 percent at the national level, and by almost 40 percent in Sicily.

The shocking murders, committed in rapid succession, of the magistrates Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino also moved large strata of the Sicilian civil society and of the entire country. Demonstrations of an unprecedented dimension took place in Palermo as well as in other parts of Italy. A march organized in memory of Giovanni Falcone thirty days after the Capaci massacre brought an estimated five hundred thousand people to Palermo.

State institutions also reacted to mafia violence with a strong counterattack, which produced the highest peak of antimafia activities in the last fifty years. A new antimafia act was passed in the summer of 1992. Seven thousand soldiers were sent to Sicily to help civil police forces, and antimafia investigations were beefed up. Since then, virtually all of the leading mafia bosses, some of them on the run for decades, have been captured and sent to special high-security prisons. Thanks to the creation of a "Witness Protection Program," more than a thousand *mafiosi* and gangsters have left their crime groups and have begun sharing their experiences with law enforcement officials. As a result of the antimafia inquiries, Italians now know more than ever before about mafia organizations themselves and the collusion between mafia members and politicians.

In 1993, Giulio Andreotti, one of the main figures in Italy's postwar history, was indicted on charges of mafia association and murder.[71] Between 1991 and 1999, more than half of the deputies of the Sicilian regional Parliament and 17 Sicilian deputies of the national Parliament were targeted on charges of mafia association and corruption. More than 110 city councils were dismissed in Campania, Calabria, and Sicily after evidence was presented of mafia infiltration. The Parliamentary Antimafia Commission of the eleventh legislature, headed by the Honorable Luciano Violante, carried out an intense campaign aimed at awakening the public opinion through meetings and hearings. The report on "mafia and politics" that the commission approved in March of 1993 represented the first official document detailing the relationship between Cosa Nostra and vast sectors of the political-institutional establishment.

More recently, however, both the antimafia and the anticorruption campaigns have progressively lost steam. This happened despite the fact that the success rate of law-enforcement action was rather high. By January of 2000, in Milan there were almost 1,000 definitive convictions out of 3,150 arrests for trial on corruption charges.[72] In Sicily and in Calabria, the leaders of all the most important mafia families and many of their members were convicted and sentenced to long-term imprisonment. In a country previously known for its incapacity to throw light on terrorist actions and "excellent murders" (i.e., murders of state officials and public personalities), the organizers and executors of the 1992–1993 terror campaign staged by Cosa Nostra were exposed and condemned.

But the campaign against crime and corruption has not been accompanied by a similarly aggressive restructuring of the political system. Notwithstanding the enthusiasm of a new generation of local politicians in Sicily, neither the Southern regions nor the central government were able to launch a coordinated reform to stimulate the social, cultural, and economic development of the Mezzogiorno. On the contrary: with the aim of entering the European Monetary Union, in the early 1990s the extraordinary public intervention in the South came to a brusque halt, and only after several years of delay was it partially supplemented by ordinary funding.[73] In recent years, Parliament passed several new measures to protect the rights of defendants and curb the "excesses" of the early 1990s, which made the magistrates' work objectively more difficult. At the same time, the legislative and executive branches failed to enact reforms that would have made the Italian justice system more efficient. As a result, many of the corruption cases initiated by the investigating judges in Milan and other cities will become statute-barred.[74]

With the partial exception of Sicily, moreover, public support of the magistrates' action did not translate into a cultural revolution. Especially in the North, the judiciary and public opinion did not forge an active alliance against corruption similar to the one that characterized the revolt against mafia power. As Paul Ginsborg put it, "*Tangentopoli* remained very much a spectator sport, far removed from the realities of everyday life. There was a crucial failure, or refusal, to connect the topics raised by the magistrates with the power structure and culture of the Italian society."[75] Ordinary Italians were never forced to ask uncomfortable questions about their own behavior, i.e., the extent to which the culture of *Tangentopoli* was in fact their own.

By the end of the 1990s, attempts to absorb the innovations and exorcise the consequent traumas of 1992–1994 multiplied, and continuities with past political practices increasingly emerged. In Milan, as in Palermo, the prosecutors and judges who investigated corruption and the mafia are now often criticized. Public opinion has tired of the seemingly endless judicial investigations. Despite convictions on corruption charges, several politicians of the so-called First Republic are again active in the Italian political scene. Others, like Giulio Andreotti, have been acquitted of all charges for want of evidence. Notwithstanding three convictions and several pending investigations on corruption charges, Silvio Berlusconi, the media tycoon-turned-politician who controls almost half of the Italian television and advertisement market, became prime minister in the general election in the spring of 2001.[76]

The window of opportunity, which was opened in the early 1990s to curb the political and economic power of the mafia, tackle corruption, and reduce the underground economy, seems to be closing again.

ENDNOTES

[1]Home Office, *Criminal Statistics, England and Wales 1997* (London: Home Office, 1998), 210–222.

[2]Ibid., 221.

[3]Much more so than mafia and corruption, both left- and right-wing terrorism made headlines in the 1970s and early 1980s and were long regarded as a serious threat to the stability of the whole country. Nonetheless, this topic is not analyzed here. Terrorism, and in particular left-wing terrorism, on which both public opinion and state institutions largely focused their attention from the mid-1970s onwards, is not peculiarly Italian, nor did it manifest itself in Italy in ways different from other Western European countries. See Donatella Della Porta, *Il terrorismo di sinistra* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1990); Donatella Della Porta, ed., *Terrorismi in Italia* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1984); and Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context* (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). It might be argued that a peculiarity of Italian right-wing terrorism is the extensive support it received from Italian and foreign secret services and segments of the army. Although ongoing investigations are showing promising results, these allegations cannot yet be judicially proved, and the circumstantial evidence that has been gathered so far is too fragmented and complicated to be presented here. Furthermore, in the Cold War era Italy was by no means the only country where Western European and U.S. secret services concluded shady deals and supported terrorist or counterrevolutionary groups. Indeed, the CIA's involvement was much deeper and further-reaching in countries such as Chile, Nicaragua, and Burma than it has ever been suspected to be in Italy. Finally, unlike the three phenomena discussed here, the reasons for the collusion between Italian right-wing groups and the secret services hardly lie in the long-term evolution of Italy's state and society (though the subversive strategy funded by the secret services was at

least partially prompted by the electoral strength of the Italian Communist Party), but are primarily to be found in the logic of the Cold War.

[4]Until the early 1980s, the predominant view among social scientists was to conceive of the mafia as a cultural attitude and a form of power, denying it a corporate dimension. See Henner Hess, *Mafia and Mafiosi: The Structure of Power* (Westmead: Saxon House, [1970] 1973); Anton Blok, *The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1860–1960: A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs* (New York and Oxford: Polity Press, [1974] 1988); and Pino Arlacchi, *Mafia Business: The Mafia Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1983] 1988).

[5]As the historian Paolo Pezzino puts it, "if it is true that these sources have to be examined with great prudence, it is also true that the statements on the existence of well structured associations are so many, finding confirmation in several judicial proceedings, that it would be difficult to deny their reliability." See Paolo Pezzino, "Stato violenza società: Nascita e sviluppo del paradigma mafioso," in Maurice Aymard and Giuseppe Giarrizzo, eds., *La Sicilia* (Turin: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1987), 905–984. For a similar opinion, see also Salvatore Lupo, "'Il tenebroso sodalizio': Un rapporto sulla mafia palermitana di fine Ottocento," *Studi storici* 29 (2) (1988): 463–489.

[6]Letizia Paoli, *Fratelli di mafia: Cosa Nostra e 'Ndrangheta* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2000), 19–76.

[7]M. G. Smith, *Corporations and Society* (London: Duckworth, 1974), 98.

[8]Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: The Free Press, [1893, 1902, 1933] 1964), 176–177.

[9]Donald Cressey, *Theft of the Nation* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).

[10]Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, [1922] 1978), 672.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Marshall D. Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics* (Chicago: Aldine Atherton, 1972), 193–200.

[13]F. Lestingi, "L'associazione della Fratellanza nella provincia di Girgenti," *Archivio di Psichiatria, Antropologia Criminale e Scienze Penali* v (1884): 452–463.

[14]Weber, *Economy and Society,* 672.

[15]Letizia Paoli, "The Paradoxes of Organized Crime," *Crime, Law and Social Change* (forthcoming, 2001).

[16]Leopoldo Franchetti, *Condizioni politiche e amministrative della Sicilia* (Rome: Donzelli, [1877] 1993), 100.

[17]For a good reconstruction of these events, see Alexander Stille, *Excellent Cadavers: The Mafia and the Death of the First Italian Republic* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995).

[18]Ralph Blumenthal, *Last Days of the Sicilians: At War with the Mafia: The FBI Assault on the Pizza Connection* (New York: Times Books, 1988).

[19]Ada Becchi and Margherita Turvani, *Proibito? Il mercato mondiale della droga* (Roma: Donzelli, 1993), 156; italics in the original.

[20]Paoli, *Fratelli di mafia*, 290–294, and "The Future of Sicilian and Calabrian Organized Crime," in Stanley Einstein and Menachem Amir, eds., *Organized Crime: Uncertainties and Dilemmas* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 155–186.

[21]Roberto Scarpinato, "Mafia e politica," in *Mafia: Anatomia di un regime* (Rome: Librerie Associate, 1992), 94.

[22]Paoli, *Fratelli di mafia*, 225–242.

[23]See Transparency International, "The 1999 Corruption Perceptions Index" and the related "Framework Document" at <http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/>.

[24]Luca Ricolfi, *L'ultimo Parlamento: Sulla fine della Prima Repubblica* (Rome: NIS, 1994).

[25]For a good reconstruction of the main corruption scandals, see Sergio Turone, *Politica ladra: Storia della corruzione in Italia, 1861–1992* (Bari-Roma: Laterza, 1992); and Alessandro Silj, *Malpaese: Criminalità, corruzione e politica nell'Italia della prima Repubblica 1943–1994* (Rome: Donzelli, 1994).

[26]Vilfredo Pareto, *Trattato di sociologia generale* (Firenze: Giunti-Barbera, 1916), 631.

[27]See Luigi Graziano, *Clientelismo e sistema politico: Il caso dell'Italia* (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1980).

[28]Sidney Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967). See also Pietro Fantozzi, *Politica clientela e regolazione sociale: Il Mezzogiorno nella questione politica italiana* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 1993).

[29]Mauro Magatti, *Corruzione politica e società italiana* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996), 31–36.

[30]The text here relies on the typology of corruption cases developed by Susan Rose-Ackerman. See Rose-Ackerman, *Corruption: A Study in Political Economy* (New York: Academic Press, 1978), 60–62.

[31]For a lively catalog of bribe exchanges, see Franco Cazzola, *L'Italia del pizzo: Fenomenologia della tangente quotidiana* (Turin: Einaudi, 1992).

[32]*Corriere della Sera*, 10 February 1996, 13, and 29 September 1996, 6.

[33]Carlo Guarnieri, "Magistratura e politica: il caso italiano," *Rivista di scienza della politica* 21 (1991): 3–32; and Giuseppe Di Lello, *Giudici: Cinquantanni di processi di mafia* (Palermo: Sellerio, 1994).

[34]See, for example, the autobiographical account of a magistrate who coordinated many of these pioneering investigations and has been a member of the "Clean Hands" pool since 1992: Gherardo Colombo, *Il vizio della memoria* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1997).

[35]See M. Calabrò, "Il porto delle nebbie," *Micromega* 5 (1995): 89–97.

[36]Magatti, *Corruzione politica e società italiana*, 53–57.

[37]Tribunale di Milano, V Sezione Penale, *La maxitangente Enimont* (Milan: Kaos, 1997).

[38]Bettino Craxi, "Il Caso C.," *Critica Sociale*, 2, supplement.

[39]*Corriere della Sera*, 15 April 1995, 1, and 8 November 1995, 15.

[40]Alejandro Portes, Manuel Castells, and Lauren A. Benton, "Conclusions: The Policy Implications of Informality," in Portes, Castells, and Benton, eds., *The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, [1989] 1991), 298–311.

[41]Office Européen de Recherches de Formation et de Conseil en Relations Sociales (ORSEU), *Measurement of the Shadow Economy: Study of Five European Countries (Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy)* by Jean Luc Bizeur, supervised by Jean-Pierre Yonnet (Brussels: ORSEU, 1995); Deloitte and Touche, *The Black Economy and Tax and Social Charges*, commissioned by the Task Force "Statutory Contributions and Charges," D.G. XXI, Brussels, European Commission, 1997; and Friedrich Schneider, *Further Empirical Results of the Size of the Shadow Economy in 17 OECD Countries Over Time* (Linz: Department of Economics, 1997). See also Luca Meldolesi, "L'economia sommersa nel Mezzogiorno," *Stato e Mercato* 53 (1998): 319–334.

[42]A labor unit corresponds to a full-time position, whether or not it is carried out by more than one person. As already mentioned, many irregular positions are part-time or second jobs. In order to have a homogenous unity of measure, the ISTAT transforms the latter into labor units, each of which corresponds to the full-time commitment of a regular employee: two part-time jobs are, thus, counted as one. See ISTAT, *Rapporto annuale: La situazione nel Paese nel 1998* (Rome: ISTAT, 1999), 146–149.

[43]Meldolesi, "L'economia sommersa nel Mezzogiorno," 330.

[44]Enzo Mingione, "The History and Recent Sources of Irregular Forms of Employment," and, with a contribution from R. Pahl, "Old and New Forms of *Travail au Noir*," in Philippe Barthelemy et al., eds., *Underground Economy and Irregular Forms of Employment: Final Synthesis Report* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990), 1–12 and 13–20; and Emilio Reyneri, *Occupati e disoccupati in Italia* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997).

[45]Ministero dei Lavori Pubblici, "Dati sull'Abusivismo Edilizio," at <http://www.llpp.it/>.

[46]Legambiente, *Rapporto Ecomafia 1999* (Rome: Legambiente, 1999) and *Rapporto Ecomafia 2001* (Rome: Legambiente, 2001). A synthesis of the latter report is available at <http://www.legambiente.com>.

[47]Meldolesi, "L'economia sommersa nel Mezzogiorno," 328–329.

[48]*Corriere della Sera*, 10 April 1997, 1 and 13, and 5 May 1999.

[49]Pino Arlacchi, *Schiavi: Il nuovo traffico degli esseri umani* (Milan: Rizzoli, 1999), 100–115.

[50]Isaia Sales, *La camorra, le camorre* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1993); and Paola Monzini, *Gruppi criminali a Napoli e a Marsiglia: La delinquenza organizzata nella storia di due città (1820–1990)* (Catanzaro: Meridiana Libri, 1999).

[51]Daniel Bell, "Crime as an American Way of Life," in Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, [1953] 1988), 127–150.

[52]It is enough to say that one of Italy's major cocaine importers in the 1990s was a former bank manager from Naples, Pasquale Centore, who organized several 400–700-kilogram cocaine shipments. Though members of Southern Italian mafia groups were among his customers, Centore operated independently and indeed was long protected by his own apparent respectability. See Letizia Paoli, *Pilot Project to Describe and Analyze Local Drug Markets—First Phase Final Report: Illegal Drug Markets in Frankfurt and Milan* (Lisbon: EMCDDA, 2000) at <http://www.emcdda.org>. More generally, see also Tom Naylor, "Loose Cannons: Cover Commerce and Underground Finance in the Modern Arms Black Market," *Crime, Law and Social Change* 22 (1995): 1–57, and "The Underworld of Gold," *Crime, Law and Social Change* 25 (1996): 191–241.

[53]Ministero dell'Interno, *Rapporto annuale sul fenomeno della criminalità organizzata (Anno 1993)* (Rome: Camera dei Deputati, 1994), doc. XXXVIII-bis, n. 1: 473–474.

[54]Guido Rey, "Analisi economica ed evidenza empirica dell'attività illegale in Italia," paper presented to Convegno della Società Italiana degli Economisti, Rome, 20 December 1992.

[55]Ibid.; and Ada Becchi and Guido Rey, *L'economia criminale* (Rome: Laterza, 1994), 25.

[56]European Commission, *Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union, Report Number 52*, Brussels, April 2000, 12–13, at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/>.

[57]Charles Tilly, "Foreword," in Blok, *The Mafia of a Sicilian Village*, xxi.

[58]Hess, *Mafia and Mafiosi*, 25.

[59]Commissione Parlamentare d'inchiesta sul fenomeno della mafia e sulle altre associazioni similari, *Relazione sui rapporti tra mafia e politica*, doc. XXIII, n. 2, XI legislatura (Rome: Camera dei Deputati, 1993).

[60]Arnaldo Bagnasco, *La costruzione sociale del mercato* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1988), 31–64.

[61]Carlo Trigilia, "Capitale sociale e sviluppo locale," *Stato e mercato* 59 (1999): 419–419.

[62]Michael Eve, "Comparing Italy: The Case of Corruption," in David Forgacs and Robert Lumley, eds., *Italian Cultural Studies: An Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 34–51.

[63]Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Dipartimento della Funzione Pubblica, *Rapporto sulle condizioni delle pubbliche amministrazioni*, Rome, 1993, 13.

[64]The reform plan is well described at <http://www.funzionepubblica.it>. This web site also includes reports and presentations made by Minister Franco Bassanini in various international conferences (some of the presentations are in English).

[65]Jeremy Boissevain, *Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators and Coalitions* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974).

[66]Alessandro Pizzorno, "La corruzione nel sistema politico," introduction to Donatella Della Porta, *Lo scambio occulto: Casi di corruzione politica in Italia* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1992), 55; italics in the original.

[67]Magatti, *Corruzione politica e società italiana*, 57–59.

[68]Umberto Santino, *Storia del movimento antimafia: Dalla lotta di classe all'impegno civile* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 2000).

[69]Jane Schneider and Peter Schneider, "Mafia, Antimafia and the Question of Sicilian Culture," *Politics and Society* 22 (2) (1994): 237–258.

[70]Tano Grasso, *Contro il racket: Come opporsi al ricatto mafioso* (Bari-Roma: Laterza, 1992).

[71]Procura della Repubblica di Palermo, Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, *Memoria depositata dal pubblico ministero nel procedimento penale n. 3538/94, instaurato nei confronti di Andreotti Giulio* (1995). See also Pino Arlacchi, *Il processo: Giulio Andreotti sotto accusa a Palermo* (Milan: Rizzoli, 1995).

[72]G. Colombo, "La via maestra della prescrizione," *Micromega* 1 (2000): 125–127.

[73]Svimez, Associazione per lo sviluppo dell'industria nel Mezzogiorno, *Rapporto 1995 sull'economia del Mezzogiorno* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1995), and *Rapporto 1998 sull'economia del Mezzogiorno* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1998).

[74]Ibid.; Piercamillo Davigo, "Il processo di Azzeccagarbugli," and Mario Almerighi, "Garantismo all'italiana," *Micromega* 1 (2000): 117–124 and 152–169.

[75]Paul Ginsborg, "Explaining Italy's Crisis," in Gundle and Parker, eds., *The New Italian Republic*, 19–39.

[76]*The Economist* (24 June 2000): 38; and *L'Espresso* (29 June 2000): 40–45.